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without ordering a responsive pleading where the face of the petition shows the petitioner is not entitled to relief in district court. *Felix*, 545 U.S. at 656. Local Rule 72-3.2 of this Court also authorizes a magistrate judge to prepare a proposed order for summary dismissal and a proposed judgment for the district judge's consideration where, as here, it plainly appears from the face of the petition that petitioner is not entitled to relief.

B. The Federal Exhaustion Doctrine

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 110 Stat. 1214, "[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that . . . the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). The purpose of AEDPA's exhaustion requirement is to give the state the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its own prisoners' federal rights. *See Baldwin v. Reese*, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347 (2004). To provide that opportunity, a prisoner "must 'fairly present' his claim in each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim." *Id*.

Here, the pending Petition raises a single claim of ineffective assistance of counsel ("IAC"). (Pet. at 5; attached pages at 7-12.) Petitioner concedes he did not appeal his judgment of conviction, and there is no record of any state habeas petitions having been filed challenging his conviction. (Pet. at 2-3; state court records. ¹/₂) Consequently, the Court finds Petitioner's pending IAC claim is unexhausted because the state courts, and most importantly the California Supreme Court, have not had the opportunity to pass upon it. § 2254(b)(1)(A); *Baldwin*, 541 U.S. at 29.

The Court takes judicial notice of Internet records relating to this action in the state appellate courts (available at http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov) ("state court records"). See Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 815 (9th Cir. 2002) (federal courts may take judicial notice of related state court documents), overruled on other grounds as recognized in Cross v. Sisto, 676 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2012).

Moreover, Petitioner's unsupported assertion that he is "currently exhausting" his IAC claim in a newly-filed habeas petition in the California Supreme Court (Pet. at 5, 8) still renders his Petition unexhausted. Because state courts "should have the first opportunity to examine the lawfulness of a state prisoner's confinement," *Batchelor v. Cupp*, 693 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1982), the exhaustion doctrine also extends to situations where the prisoner has a post-conviction challenge to his conviction still pending in the state courts. *Sherwood v. Tomkins*, 716 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1983); *see also Schnepp v. Oregon*, 333 F.2d 288, 288 (9th Cir. 1964). This is because "[i]f the prisoner's claim is meritorious, and if the state remedy is prompt and complete, there is no need to bring post-conviction proceedings in federal courts." *Sherwood*, 716 F.2d at 633 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, to the extent Petitioner is correct that he has a habeas petition raising his IAC claim pending before the California Supreme Court, his Petition before this Court is an unexhausted petition. *Id.* at 633-34; *Schnepp*, 333 F.2d at 288.

Finally, Petitioner's accompanying motion for a stay [2] is denied. While district courts have the discretion in limited circumstances to hold a mixed or fully exhausted petition in abeyance pending the exhaustion of unexhausted claims, *Rhines v. Weber*, 544 U.S. 269, 273-79, 125 S. Ct. 1528 (2005), *Kelly v. Small*, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066-71 (9th Cir. 2003), *King v. Ryan*, 564 F.3d 1133, 1138-41 (9th Cir. 2009), a district court is "obliged to dismiss immediately" when the petition contains no exhausted claims. *Jiminez v. Rice*, 276 F.3d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); *see also Rasberry v. Garcia*, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Once a district court determines that a habeas petition contains only unexhausted claims, . . . it may simply dismiss the habeas petition for failure to exhaust."). Petitioner, having presented a fully unexhausted Petition, is not entitled to a stay of this action because it must be dismissed. *Coleman v. Thompson*, 501 U.S. 722, 731, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991) ("a state prisoner's federal habeas petition should be dismissed if the prisoner has not exhausted available state remedies")

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the reference to the Magistrate Judge is vacated and the Petition is dismissed without prejudice. DATED: December 20, 2013 Presented by:

Dale S. Lescher

DALE S. FISCHER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Arthur Nakazato United States Magistrate Judge